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evidence as a matter of right in order to correct any omissions
or misstatements.
Another question which presents itself is whether the child
should have a right to choose a public hearing. A statute could
be drafted to admit members of the press, if the child so chooses,
as long as his name is not reported.
These and other questions as to the validity of the Family
Court Act must await the United States Supreme Court's determination concerning due process in the realm of juvenile
law. It is recommended, during the interim, that the provisions
of the Family Court Act be closely scrutinized by the courts to
determine whether they provide not only for the rehabilitation
of the juvenile offender, but also protect his rights in accordance
with the basic requirements of due process of law.

X
MANUFACTURER'S STRICT TORT LIABILITY TO CONSUMERS FOR

EcoNo IC Loss
As American courts become increasingly aware of the need
for protecting consumers from defective goods, the law of products
liability correspondingly develops at a rapid and fascinating pace.
Privity of contract, fault as the basis of liability, and other classical
common-law concepts as prerequisites for liability are becoming
antiquated or radically modified. Virtually every state holds the
manufacturer liable to the consumer for negligence in the production
of products when it ultimately results in physical injury.' Indeed,
a few courts have held manufacturers liable for property damage
where no risk of personal injury was present, basing recovery
on express representations made directly to the consumer by the
manufacturer.2 However, absent the risk of personal injury or
express representations, attempts to expand the law of products
liability to encompass the economic loss of subpurchasers have met
great resistance.
Plaintiffs seeking to recover in negligence actions by invoking
traditional products liability theories have generally been denied
recovery when the product has not threatened or caused physical

I PRosSER, ToRTs § 96 (3d ed. 1964). Various theories, including warranty and strict liability in tort, have been used to hold manufacturers liable
when a defect in a product causes personal injuries. See generally Prosser,
The Assault Upom the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Cotwumer), 69 YAIZ
LJ. 21099 (1960).

E.g., Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5,
181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
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harm.3 An extraordinary example is TWA v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp.4 There, the court dismissed TWA's suit to recover the cost
of repairing airplane engines which might have caused an accident
if certain defects had not been discovered. 5
Courts have been more willing to allow recovery when the
consumer's economic loss is a result of reliance upon the express
representations of the manufacturer. Express warranty recovery
is not necessarily based upon contractual principles, although such
a rationale is tenable. Rather, it is held that since the manufacturer
intentionally induced reliance and received benefits from the transaction, he should be held to the truth of the inducement.6 Nevertheless, various limitations are inherent in express warranty recovery. The user or consumer must establish reliance upon the
manufacturer's representation, not that of the retailer or intermediary, and show that the product's defect comes within the scope
of that representation. 7 Moreover, the plaintiff must be a member
of the class which can justify reliance on the terms of the representation. 8 Significantly, these warranties, asserted to be in lieu
of all others, express or implied, generally assure only that the
product is free from defects in materials and workmanship, and
limit the consumer's remedy to repair and replacement of defective parts. Potential recovery by a consumer is thereby greatly
limited, especially when plaintiff has suffered severe consequential
damages.9
Implied warranty has been the basis of recovery in very few
cases in which economic loss alone has been alleged.10 Courts
3 See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1. Contra, Lang v. General Motors
Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965); Fischer v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207,

112 N.W.2d 705 (1961). While these decisions may not portend generally
accepted changes in the law of negligence, they indicate some judicial realization that the plaintiff who suffers economic loss is entitled to relief by
some means.

4 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct 1955), aff'd without opinion,

2 App. Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1st Dep't 1956).
5 See also Amodeo v. Autocraft Hudson, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 499, 207
N.Y.S.2d 101 (2d Dep't 1960); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St
2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
6 Note, Economic Loss Ip Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 CoLUM.
L. REv. 917, 932 (1966).
That the express representation may be made by
advertising or included in labels was established in Randy Knitwear, Inc. v.
American Cyanamid Co., supra note 2.
7E.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P2d 145, 45 Cal.
R ptr. P17 (1965).
8 ROSSER, op- Cit. supra note 1, § 98; Fleischman v. Hockett, 49 Wash.
2d 328, 301 P.2d 166 (1956).
9 Express warranty has often been unnecessarily confused with fraud
concepts. See Seavy, Actions for Economic Harm-A Comment, 32 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1242 (1957).
10 See Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius,
Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Spence v. Three Rivers
Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
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have proceeded very cautiously in this area, initially limiting the
manufacturer's liability to cases involving harmful food and drugs
and then extending the rule to "inherently dangerous" products
causing personal injuries. Eventually, injured members of the
consumer's household were permitted recovery..1
Implied warranty thus evolved as a series of exceptions to the privity requirement. Formulation of a single, logical rule of recovery was
impossible; different products and plaintiffs necessitated individual
treatment. 12 Finally, candid recognition of the fictional nature
of the implied warranty doctrine was made by some courts. It
was recognized that strict liability in tort is "surely a more accurate
phrase." 3
It was in this framework that two courts recently considered
actions for economic loss based on strict tort liability. In the earlier
case allowing recovery for economic loss, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,14 the plaintiff purchased an expensive-but defective-rug from a retailer. After attempts to secure satisfaction
from the retailer failed, the plaintiff commenced an action against
the manufacturer for the price of the rug. Although the product
was nationally advertised, there was no evidence that the plaintiff
had relied on these representations. In addition, while the rug
was described as "No. 1 grade" by either the retailer or the
manufacturer, the court did not attempt to base recovery on
express warranty. Instead, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
based recovery on the alternate theories of implied warranty and
strict liability in tort, expressly rejecting the lower court's holding
that actions in implied warranty without privity were limited to
cases involving products dangerous to life or limb.' 5
The Supreme Court of California considered but rejected the
extension of strict liability made by the Santor court in Seely v.
White Motor Co.' There, the plaintiff purchased a White Motor
Company truck from an intermediary dealer, which was unsuitable for use in the plaintiff's business. While the contract of
sale included the standard manufacturer's warranty assuring replacement of defective parts, the evidence was that the plaintiff
11 Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39
(1961).
2
E.g., Hensel, Food, Beverages, And Their Containers, 1964 U. ILL. L.F.

705; Krause, Products Liability And The Independent Contractor, 1964 U.
Itt. L.F. 748.
'1 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d
81, 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963). Accord, Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). See also
Prosser, supra note 1, at 1124-25.
1444 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
10 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 82 NJ. Super. 319, 321, 197
A2d 589, 590 (Super. Ct App. Div. 1964).
l Supra note 7.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.- 41

believed this obligation was assumed by the dealer rather than
the manufacturer. The manufacturer's attempts to repair the
defect having failed, the plaintiff allowed the truck to be repossessed
and sued the manufacturer in express warranty for recovery of
that portion of the purchase price paid, and for losses resulting
from inability to use the truck in his business. Alleging further
that the defect had caused an accident in which the truck was
damaged, he sought recovery either in strict tort liability or negligence. The court permitted rescission of the contract and recovery
of lost profits based on express representations even though reliance on the representations had not been proven. Damages
resulting from the accident were denied because there was no
evidence that the defect caused the accident.
Thus, the case marked no departure from precedent. However, the decision is significant because of the court's lengthy dictum
rejecting the Santor rationale. Strict tort liability, the court
argued, replaced the fictional implied warranty theory only when
a dangerous product caused the "overwhelming misfortune" of personal injury. Commercial law, namely the law of warranty with its
17
contractual ramifications, governed in economic loss cases.
Vigorously rejecting this conclusion, Justice Peters concurred
in the result, insisting that no policy required this distinction
between personal injuries and economic loss, and that the considerations which gave rise to the liability of the manufacturer
to the consumer in the former were equally valid with respect to
the latter.
This note attempts to grapple with the issue presented in
Santor and Seely. It is submitted that a solution to the problem
of recovery for economic loss will be the next critical step in the
development of the law of products liability. To treat this
problem adequately, the concepts of economic loss and strict liability
in tort must be defined. The interrelationships between the manufacturer's liability under the Uniform Commercial Code and
under the theory of strict tort liability must be considered. Finally,
the conflicting rationales and policy bases of traditional products
liability doctrines must be evaluated with an intent to resolve their
real and apparent conflicts and to establish a viable doctrine to
govern consumers' actions for economic loss.
17 See also Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502 (Ore. 1965) wherein the
Supreme Court of Oregon considered both Seely and Santor. Plaintiff sued
a wholesaler to rescind the sale of a defective tractor and to recover lost
profits. In denying the applicability of strict tort doctrine, the court followed
Seely, predicating liability on the nature of the damage caused by the defective product. A dissent maintained in part that the placing of goods on
the market gives rise to an implied warranty which is a sufficient base for
strict tort liability.
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Definitions

Economic Loss
For purposes of analysis, economic loss may be divided into
direct and consequential. Actions for direct economic loss may be
defined as those alleging damages due either to a product injuring
itself or to the product being unfit for its general purposes.'8
They may be measured by the "out of pocket" or "loss of bargain"
rules, or by the cost of replacement or repair.' 9 Consequential
economic loss is injury extrinsic to the defective or damaged
product, such as a loss of profits resulting from the inability to use
the product. This does not include harm to other objects or persons since no physical damage to persons or property other than the
defective product itself are here considered to be within the scope
of economic loss actions. Such physical damages to objects exterior
to the product are best described as personal injury or property
damage. In addition, when the product itself is harmed in an
accident, property damage results.
Manufacturers today extend a standard "warranty" to consumers which is actually a disclaimer of virtually all the implied
warranties imposed by the Uniform Commercial Code. The liability
a manufacturer is willing to accept under such a warranty is
equivalent to that which results from direct economic loss, i.e.,
restoring the consumer's loss of bargain. What the manufacturer
is quite unwilling to accept by contract, or otherwise, is liability
for any consequential economic losses. It is this liability which
the strict tort liability approach of Santor and the unconscionability
approach of the Uniform Commercial Code threaten to force upon
the manufacturer.
Economic loss may also be the result of a product being unfit
for a particular purpose although it is reasonably able to perform
its usual functions. Since it is clear that recovery for this kind
of loss is dependent upon express representations, for purposes
of analysis, such loss will be excluded from the definition of
economic loss as used in this note.
Strict Liability in Tort
Strict liability in tort is utilized to hold manufacturers or other
sellers of goods liable to ultimate consumers for certain injuries
caused by defective products. Strict liability in tort eliminates the
principal requirement of a negligence action-the violation of a
lBE.g., Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227
(Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1958).
'I

Note, Economic Loss In Products Liability Juriosprudence, 66 CoLum.

L. REv. 917, 918 (1966).
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duty of care owed to the particular plaintiff. Under this doctrine,
the manufacturer is not absolutely liable to all his consumers;
rather, the prerequisite of negligence is replaced by the requirement that the plaintiff prove that the product was defective when
it left the manufacturer's control and that this defect caused
injury. The focal point of a consumer-plaintiff's cause of action
is thereby transferred from the degree of care employed by the
defendant manufacturer to the quality of the product itself. Presumably, his cause of action can be established much more readily
here than in negligence even when the latter is coupled with the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.2 0 A defendant may overcome the
inference of negligence raised by res ipsa loquitur by establishing
that he exercised reasonable care and that injuries similar to
plaintiff's occur despite reasonable precautions, while reasonable care
is irrelevant with respect to strict liability in tort.
Strict tort liability had previously been limited in application
to cases where the "overwhelming misfortune" of personal injury
was caused or threatened by defective products. Indeed, according
to the Restatement, it is only when the product is "unreasonably
dangerous" that the manufacturer or other seller is liable for the
resulting property damage or physical harm. 21 Recovery for
economic loss was previously considered to be governed solely by
the Uniform Sales Act and Uniform Commercial Code. The
Santor decision extends strict tort liability to all defective products
actions even where there is no danger of personal injury and
whether or not the damages are significant.

20 See Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault And The
Requirement
Of A Defect, 41 TExAs L. REv. 855 (1963).
2
3 SREATmENT (SECOND), TopTs § 402A (1965) provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
While no distinction is made between types of property damage, the "unreasonably dangerous" limitation would seem to preclude most economic loss
recovery.
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The Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort
In rejecting the applicability of the law of sales to determine
the manufacturer's liability, the Santor court seemed to imply that
its decision was not influenced by the Uniform Commercial Code
[hereinafter referred to as UCC].2
Perhaps this reflects the
court's belief that, since the UCC was developed to codify and
standardize commercial law, it is an inappropriate device to protect
consumers. This view, however, seems to ignore the clear intent
23
of the Commentators that the UCC is to apply to consumer sales.
It is necessary to compare Santor and other recent New Jersey decisions to understand it in context and to determine how strict
liability departs from statutory liability. The comparison will also
serve to distinguish the Santor and Seely approaches, for, presumably, the UCC will henceforth be the guide for recovery of
economic loss in California.
Implied Warranty of Merchantability
The most fundamental principle of Santor is that when a
manufacturer places a product in the stream of commerce it is
impliedly warranted to be "reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such articles are sold and used. ....
,, 24 This language
is virtually identical to that of UCC Section 2-314(2) (c) which
describes the implied warranty of merchantability 2 5 It thus appears
that both the concept of implied warranty and the criteria for
22 Although the UCC was in effect at the time the decision was rendered,
it was not in effect at the time the facts of this case took place. The then
applicable Uniform Sales Act was cited once but summarily rejected. Santor
v. A & M Karaghensian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 67, 207 A.2d 305, 313 (1965).
23 Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers
in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 995 (1966). Two provisions explicitly referring to sales to ultimate consumers are UCC §§ 2-318,
2-719.
24
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., supra note 22, at 67, 207 A.2d
at 313 (1965).
25 UCC § 2-314(2) provides:
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
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determining if a product is defective are the same under the UCC
and in strict tort liability. It seems that the detailed definition
of merchantability provided by section 2-314(2) may be utilized
to determine defectiveness.2 6
Nevertheless, nowhere in the Santor decision is there reference
to the fact that implied warranty of merchantability is a rule
of .the UCC. Indeed, it was stated that the concept of defectiveness
is "a broad one" which must be developed "by courts mindful
that the public interest demands consumer protection. ' 27 It may
be assumed that the New Jersey courts will not be restricted by
the UCC definition in this area. However, this position is not
inconsistent with the UCC. In the UCC, the definition used is
not meant to be circumscriptive of the warranty, for the draftsmen have made it clear that the words of section 2-314 do not
is to
exhaust the meaning of merchantable and "the intention
28
leave open other possible attributes of merchantability."
Chief Justice Traynor, speaking for the California Supreme
Court, seems to be the lone dissenter in the use of the term
"defect" as equivalent to "unmerchantable." In Seely, he seemed
29
to equate defectiveness with lack of fitness for a particular purpose.
As Justice Peters indicated in his dissent, to establish liability
for unfitness for a particular purpose an express representation
must be proven. 80
Disclaimers
The power to disclaim conscionably is an incident of the
freedom of contract preserved by the UCC. 3' The remedies
provided therein may be altered or modified by contract as long
as a "fair quantum" of remedy remains.3 2 While limitation or
exclusion of damages for personal injury is prima facie unconscionable, limitation of damages for economic loss is not.3
The main limitation upon a seller's ability to disclaim is UCC
Section 2-302 which provides that if a contract or any clause
thereof is found to be unconscionable at the time it was made,
the court may refuse to enforce it. The Official Comment states
26 Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between; The Uniformn Commercial Code And Strict Liability In Tort, 19
RuTGEas L. RaV. 692, 701 (1965).
27 44 N.J. at 67, 207 A.Z:I at 313.
See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44
N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
2S UCC § 2-314, comment 6.
29 Seely v. White Motor Co., supra note 7, at 17, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal.
Rptr. at 22.
so Id. at 26, 403 P.2d at 156, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
31 UCC § 1-102, comment 2.
32 UCC § 2-719, comment 1.
33 UCC § 2-719(3) (c).
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the principle as "the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise
and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power." 34 This limited definition has caused some
authors to believe the section gives courts too much authority to
35
change private agreements, thus subverting freedom of contract.
general
section,
the
Because of the few decisions interpreting
Nevertheless,
principles of application cannot be formulated.
analysis of the Comment indicates that the section may be reasonably applied to abuses which are the result of disparate bargaining
power.
Freedom of contract is realistic only when the contract represents meaningful negotiation between the parties. If one of the
parties is oppressed or unfairly surprised as a result of unfair
advantages attributable to the other party's superior bargaining
position, the assumption that the contract is a result of free negotiation is untenable.3 6 It has been argued that this conclusion
contradicts the Commentators' statement that the purpose of section
2-302 is not to disturb "allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power." However, the objectives of preventing oppression and unfair surprise may not be reached unless contracts which
result from unfair bargaining power are unenforceable under this
section. Oppression can only result from terms being imposed
upon the weaker party who, although aware of the consequences,
is forced to do business on the stronger party's terms or not
at all.37 Unfair surprise may also be the result of disparity
in bargaining power. Unfair surprise may be caused either by
sharp practices such as misleading statements as to the terms of
a writing,33 or by including terms in a contract which are unlikely
to be read or understood.3 9 Also, the Comment may be reasonably
understood as cautionary, for not all contracts in which one party
obtains advantages because of superior bargaining power are necessarily unconscionable.
Means other than the unconscionability provision are available
to restrict the manufacturer's disclaimer power. The disclaimer

3a UCC § 2-302, comment 1.
35 E.g., King, Suggested Changes in The Uniform Commercial CodeSales, 33 Or- L. REv. 113, 115-16 (1954); Comment, Bargaining Power And
Uneonscionability: A Suggested Approach To UCC Section 2-302, 114 U.

PA. L. REv. 998 n.3 (1966).

N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
37 Comment, supra note 35, at 999; 79 HAav. L. REv. 1299, 1301 (1966).
3879 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1301 (1966).
36 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32

39 See also Hawkland, Major Changes Under the Uniform Commercial

Code in the Formation and Terms of Sales Contracts, 10 PRAc. LAw. 73, 89

(1964).
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will be interpreted strictly against its maker;40 it may be shown
that the disclaimer did not come to the buyer's attention;41 and
the disclaimer must be in accordance with the UCC requirement
that it be conspicuous.42
When liability is founded in tort, contract concepts may be
ostensibly rejected, liability being imposed by law rather than being
voluntarily assumed by contracting parties. Since consumer protection and redress is the basic purpose, courts need not permit
this social policy to be hampered by the disclaimers of a party
with vast bargaining power. 43 Thus, it may be concluded that
disclaimers and limitations of liability are unenforceable and
irrelevant in tort actions.4 4 However, the fact remains that assumption of risk 4 5 and, perhaps, contributory negligence 46 are
recognized defenses to strict liability. To establish these defenses,
it must be proven that the plaintiff was aware of the danger
he is said to have assumed or had proper knowledge of the
conduct required of him. A conspicuous, commercially reasonable,
and commonly understandable disclaimer may be sufficient to establish plaintiff's awareness. 4
This may be roughly equivalent
to a finding that the plaintiff was neither oppressed nor unfairly
surprised, thereby making the disclaimer conscionable. For example, if a product is sold at a reduced price and is marked "as
is" or "with defects," the disclaimer may not be enforced as a matter of contract but is nevertheless relevant evidence of the plaintiff's willingness to assume the risk. Other factors, such as a
limitation of liability in the contract of sale and the retail price
which the manufacturer contemplated, would also be relevant in
determining the extent of the manufacturer's liability.
10 Myers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514, 235 S.W.2d 988 (1951); Jarnot v. Ford
Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A2d 568 (1959); Frigidinners, Inc. v.
Branchiown
Gun Club, 176 Pa. Super. 643, 109 A.2d 202 (1954).
41
Minikes v. Admiral Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 1012, 266 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Dist.

Ct. 1966); Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, Inc., 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d

110 (Munic. Ct. New York 1939). Fraud may also be a basis for overcoming a disclaimer. See Winsey v. Spitzer Motor Sales, Inc., 12 Misc. 2d 56,
174 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. T. 1958).
42 UCC§ 2-316(2).
43
Note, Disclaimers Of Warranty In Consunr Sales, 77 HAuv. L. REv.
318, 327-28 (1963).
44E.g,
Rapson, supra note 26, at 711.
45
Maiorino v. Weco Prods., Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A2d 18 (1965). See
generally Keeton, Assumption of Prodtcts Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965).
46The New Jersey Supreme Court held contributory negligence to be a
defense in a strict tort action in Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965). But see Prosser, The Assault Upon
The Citadel (Strict Liability To The Consumer), 69 YAiz L.J. 1099, 1147

(1960).
41

Cf. PRossm, TORTS

§ 78 (3d ed. 1964).

48 See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 68, 207 A2d 305,
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Statute of Limitations
Under the UCC, an action for breach of warranty normally
must be commenced within four years from the date the seller
tenders delivery.49 On the other hand, under New Jersey statutes,
and the statutes in many states,50 the period of limitation is two
years from the date of the personal injury,5 or six years from the
date that the consumer suffers property damages.5 2 Which statute
would be applicable in Santor, remains unresolved. It would seem,
however, that the court's insistence that the consumer not be
limited by the intricacies of the law of sales would tend to favor
a decision in favor of the use of the strict liability in tort theory.
Although this might allow actions for economic loss many years
after the original sale, possibly imposing a heavy burden upon manufacturers, the plaintiff would be equally burdened to prove that the
defect was in existence while the product was in the control of the
manufacturer and that he had no cause to know of the defect earlier.
In any event, the issue remains unresolved.
Notice
In order to "defeat commercial bad faith," UCC Section
2-607(3) (a) provides that a buyer must notify the seller within a
reasonable time after he discovers a breach. In Santor, the
plaintiff notified the dealer immediately, but did not bring the
defect to the attention of the manufacturer of the rug until almost
three years after the defect had been discovered. The defense
that notice had not been given in accordance with the then applicable
provisions of the Uniform Sales Act was rejected, the court stating
that "the sections have no application in actions such as this
one...

,,

.

I

While, at first, it might seem that this holding and the UCC
provisions are contradictory, analysis of the Comment indicates that
it may be interpreted as supporting the court's holding. First,
only "reasonable" time for notification is required. Reasonable
may be defined differently in a commercial setting than in an
ordinary consumer's situation. Furthermore, it is explicitly stated
313 (1965). There, the court noted that the contemplated retail price would
be one measure of the manufacturer's liability.
4o UCC § 2-725. Where it is expressly stated, the statute of limitations
may be reduced to not less than one year or extended where the warranty
specifically refers to a future event.
" E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRac. LAw § 213; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-601, 2-602
(1933);
MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 541.05, 541.07 (1947).
r1 N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A :14-2.
52 N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A :14-1.
53 44 N.J. at 68, 207 A.2d at 313. Accord, Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962).
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that notification is merely "designed to defeat commercial bad
54
faith, not to deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy."
This may be interpreted as meaning that the notice provision, while
applicable to the consumer, has little significance. Mviere service
of the complaint before the running of the statute of limitations
may constitute timely notice. 55 There is thus no great conflict
between strict liability in tort and the UCC in this area.
Privity; Warranty of Services
The UCC extends the seller's liability on an express or implied
warranty to any person in the family or household, or to a guest
of the buyer, where it is reasonable to expect that this person
would be affected by a breach of warranty.5 The intent of this
section, as expressed in the Comment, was neither to enlarge
nor to restrict the developing case law.57 While the defense of
privity is still recognized in some jurisdictions,"'S New Jersey's
position in virtually abolishing all remnants of privity in products
liability actions is not inconsistent with the UCC.
The official comment to Section 2-313 of the UCC proclaims
that "warranties need not be confined . . . to sales contracts. . . ." 59
This provision was quoted by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Cintronev. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv.,60 wherein strict
tort liability was extended to the leasing of motor vehicles. This
is an example of the New Jersey court's liberal interpretation of a
UCC provision to justify an extension of strict products liability.
Policy Considerations
A comparison of the provisions of the IJCC with the rationale
of the Santor court reveals that the approach outlined in either
may yield strikingly similar results. Indeed, the strict liability
rule might differ from the UCC only in the areas of disclaimers
and the statute of limitations. Other results of the application
of strict liability in tort, such as restrictions on the notice and
privity requirements, can be justified under the UCC. Thus, it
has been said that, since the conclusion reached in either case
5 UCC § 2-607, comment 4.

55 Compare Ruderman v. Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 23 Conn.
Supp. 416, 184 A.2d 63 (Ct. C.P. 1962), with Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers

Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
56 UCC § 2-318.
5 UCC § 2-318, comment 3.

58 E.g., Atlas Aluminum Corp. v. Borden Chem. Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53
(E.D. Pa. 1964); Hocbgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d

575 (1963).
59 UCC § 2-313, comment 2.

60 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
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61
would be the same, the statutory approach is to be preferred.
Nevertheless, policy considerations may justify the Santor decision.
These policy arguments are now to be considered.
Damages of Plaintiff as Operative Factor
There are several possible explanations for Chief Justice
Traynor's reluctance to use strict tort theory in the Seely case.
It has been suggested that he may have desired to show more
conservative courts that the strict tort liability theory introduced
in his opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,62 was not
an opening of Pandora's box. 3 By limiting the strict liability
theory to physical injury cases, wider recognition by other courts
seems likely. Thereafter, expansion to economic loss cases is
merely a matter of time. Also, in citing TWA v. CurtissWright Corp.,6 4 Chief Justice Traynor indicated he was aware
of the anomaly of permitting recovery for economic loss based
on strict liability and denying recovery when negligence can be
proven.6" He may have felt that, since the negligence theory
would be expanded to include economic66 loss, economic interests
would eventually be sufficiently protected.
The facts in Seely were not the strongest upon which to predicate expanded strict liability. Even Justice Peters, advocating
the tort approach, recognized that it was a "close case" as to
whether the plaintiff was a commercial buyer or an ordinary
consumer. While Mr. Seely's business used only one truck, it
was nevertheless used for commercial profit. He was, therefore,
arguably in a better bargaining position than most consumers.
It is doubtful, however, that Chief Justice Traynor was correct
in believing that the plaintiff's bargaining position was on a
par with the manufacturer's, so that he could "shop around" for
a better warranty.
Conjecture aside, the clear holding of the Seely case is that
UCC provisions, and not strict liability, are applicable to the
recovery of economic loss. The type of plaintiff, whether ordinary
consumer or commercial buyer, is immaterial; it is the type
of damage which determines the means of recovery. The plaintiff
is left to face the obstacles which the strict liability in tort doctrine
was developed to obviate.

61 Comment, Manufacturer's Liability To Remote Purclasers For "Eco-

nonnic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539, 549
(1966); 79 HARv. L. Rv. 1315, 1319 (1966).
62 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
63 Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers
in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 1002 (1966).
64 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct 1955), aff'd 'without opinion,
2 App. Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1st Dep't 1956).
5 63 Cal. 2d at 22-23, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
66 Movement in this direction was indicated in Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal.
2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
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Justice Peters noted some of the problems apparent in the
majority's decision. His argument that Seely did not rely on the
manufacturer's representations may be dismissed as based on a
mere technicality, since such reliance may be considered implicit.
Not so easily disregarded is his criticism of the holding that the
type of damage, whether to person or property, determines the
method of recovery:
How can the nature of the damages which occur later, long after the
transaction has been completed, determine the character of the transaction? Any line which determines whether damages should be
covered by warranty law or the
strict liability doctrine should be drawn
67
at the time the sale is made.
Drawing the line on the basis of the type of damages results in
divergent conclusions. For example, it seems likely that the
California court would now permit strict liability recovery when
a defect causes personal injuries, no matter how slight, but not
when the same defect causes only economic loss, no matter how
great. In addition, when one defect causes personal injuries,
property damages, and economic loss, the question arises as to
what theory should be applied. The strict tort doctrine might
be allowed for all of plaintiff's injuries, or the losses might be
separated and economic loss left to be governed by the UCC.
Where economic loss is the major item of recovery, this might
be considered the controlling factor, making the UCC applicable
to the entire suit.6
Either solution has practical and logical
defects.
Another difficulty, recognized by justice Peters, was present
in the Santor approach, wherein recovery turned on the nature
of the plaintiff. The difficulty is in distinguishing between commercial buyers who are governed by the UCC and ordinary consumers who may use a tort doctrine. While the distinction must
necessarily be clarified by case law, relevant factors are apparent.
The initial criterion will probably be the purpose of the plaintiff
in purchasing the goods. If the product is for a business use,
the purchaser may nevertheless stand in the same position as an
ordinary consumer, where the value of the purchase or the size
of his business is not large enough to enable him to bargain as
an equal with the manufacturer. Relative bargaining position seems
to be a key factor. Since strict tort liability was developed
with the consumer in mind, it seems that the Santor plaintifforiented approach is more logical and -practical than the damage
emphasis of Seely.
67 63

Cal. 2d at 26, 403 P.2d at 156, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
68 Franklin, supra note 63, at 982.
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However, logic alone is not sufficient to warrant the adoption
of strict tort liability for economic loss in the face of the UCC,
since such injury to the consumer is usually minor.6 9 The Santor
decision, therefore, necessitates rethinking of the policy considerations which were advanced in favor of strict tort liability. These
include the deterrence of unreasonable conduct of producers, the
facilitation of remedy by removal of circuitous actions, and the
producer's greater risk-spreading ability.70
Deterrence of Unreasonable Conduct
One factor to be considered in expanding tort liability is its
effect as a deterrent to the undesirable conduct sought to be
controlled.7 1 Chief Justice Traynor recognized this factor in
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., wherein he first argued for
the adoption of strict liability. He stressed society's interest in
discouraging "the marketing of products having defects that are
a menace to the public." 72 Strict liability is thus intended to
induce the manufacturer to improve methods of quality control,
so as to avoid liability for defective products.
Since the economic loss of ordinary consumers is likely to be
less than the loss resulting from personal injury, it is arguable
that the slight increase in liability caused by strict liability is
not likely to deter shoddy products. As has been seen, the manufacturer is already liable for his express representations and he
may also be held on the basis of the implied warranty imposed
73
by the UCC upon each buyer and seller in the marketing chain.
Moreover, another avenue of recovery may be provided if consumers are permitted recovery of economic loss on the basis of
negligence. Finally, direct economic loss is generally compensated for by the producer as a matter of good business practice.
A forceful argument nevertheless remains in support of the
deterrent effects of strict liability. While, admittedly, damages in
the category of economic loss to consumers are not usually substantial, where, as in the case of a small grocer who loses business
because of a defective heater, the consequential damages can
amount to a great deal more money than the value of the product
itself. The potential for numerous suits, individually not very
significant but cumulatively quite expensive, will definitely tend to
In Seely, the plaintiff's damages were
69 Mr. Santor recovered $1,512.
the cost of a truck and some loss of profits.
70 See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability
To The Conmsmer), 69 YAiL L.J. 1099 (1960); McNiece & Thornton,
Is The Law Of Negligence Obsolete?, 26 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 255 (1952).
71PRossER, ToRTs § 5 (3d ed. 1964).
7224 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (concurring opinion).
73 UCC § 2-314.
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force the manufacturer to improve methods of quality control.
Thus, the policy of deterrence of unreasonable conduct is as applicable to economic loss as it is to personal injury liability.
Otherwise, there would remain the anomaly of permitting strict
liability recovery where a defect causes only slight personal injury,
while denying recovery for substantial economic loss caused by
the same defect.
Circuity of Actions
In Santor, the court noted that because of the implied warranty now imposed by the UCC upon each buyer and seller in
the marketing chain, the manufacturer would ultimately be responsible for the plaintiff's injuries. Hence, in removing the requirement of privity, the rights of the parties are more economically settled and the possibility that recovery will be defeated by
lack of jurisdiction, insolvency, or the running of the statute of
limitations is diminished. This position has been attacked on
the basis that as procedural inconveniences are solved, new ones
are created.
Each party in the marketing chain may have personal defenses, such as conscionable disclaimers or contracts limiting liabilThe
ity, which might ultimately insulate the manufacturer.
privity requirement is considered justifiable because of the dif74
ficulty of establishing these defenses against third parties.
For example, if the manufacturer in Santor had sold the rug
to the retailer "as is" at a discount and the retailer represented to
the consumer that the rug was "Grade No. 1," facts concerning
the relationships between the consumer and the retailer and
between the retailer and the manufacturer would be necessary
for the manufacturer's defense. Evidence from the retailer would
also be required in order to determine whether the plaintiff
is a commercial buyer rather than a consumer, and whether the
plaintiff assumed the risk of loss, e.g., by accepting a conscionable
disclaimer. Moreover, if the plaintiff claims loss of bargain
damages, the retailer may be needed to corroborate the terms
of the sale.
Many of these problems may be eliminated by allowing the
manufacturer to make the retailer a third party. This is permitted
75
in most states which have adopted liberalized impleader provisions.
There, the retailer should be joined when jurisdiction has been
obtained and it can be shown that he is a necessary party.
Aside from this procedural difficulty, elimination of the privity
7479 HARV.

75

L. Rzv. 1315, 1317 (1966).

E.g., N.J. SupE1. CT. (Civ.) R. 4:14-1.
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requirement will, in the majority of cases, provide the plaintiff
with a solvent defendant while multiple suits are avoided. There
is, thus, little reason for demanding privity in economic loss
actions while the requirement is eliminated in other products
liability actions.
Risk Spreading
Viewing the problem solely in the context of tort, the
question is simply whether the manufacturer, retailer, or consumer
should be burdened with the economic loss. The frequently
advanced risk spreading argument has been used to hold manufacturers liable for personal injury because of their greater
ability to maintain a reserve for anticipated losses by distributing
the expenses to purchasers through increased prices.76 It has been
successfully maintained in most jurisdictions that the extreme
hardship of personal injuries justifies this result, but no similar
well-settled cause of action has been developed to compensate
consumers for economic losses.
The argument is made in the area of economic loss that both
the retailer 77 and the consumer have sufficient resources to bear
the risk of this relatively slight loss. A second argument advanced
is that strict tort liability for economic loss may result in economic
dislocation and the destruction of marginal enterprises, unless the
risk is insurable. Consequential economic loss is less ascertainable than is the loss for personal injuries. Present provisions
in product liability insurance policies generally do not provide
for indemnification for economic loss. It is further maintained
that, since such loss is generally sustained in the consumer's
business, the consumer is in a better position to estimate the
extent of the loss and insure accordingly.7a The argument suggests that the solution would be to allow contractual limitations
on liability between each intermediary in the distribution chain,
79
thereby establishing a readily insurable risk for each to assume.
It can be seen, however, that the two arguments are inconsistent. The first is based upon the belief that economic loss
will be minimal, the second that it will be significant. In addition,
the arguments may be attacked individually. Since the damages
resulting from economic loss can range from minimal to significant,
78
;Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
7 Note, Privity Elimitated As A Requirement In Loss-Of-Bargain Products Liability Cases-The Effects Of Santor, 19 RuTGERs L. REv. 715, 725
(1965).
78 Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM.
L. REv. 917, 955-58 (1966).
79Id. at 965.
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the consumer who suffers such loss is in no better position to
anticipate his chances of suffering economic loss than he is to
anticipate personal injuries. Therefore, he cannot properly be
expected to insure against the remote possibility of a defect.
As compared to the manufacturer, who can easily spread the cost
of the risk, the consumer is not the one upon whom the law should
impose the burden of insuring. Finally, a contractual system
of risk spreading, developed by the intermediaries in the distribution chain, has failed to materialize. If such a system is to
be developed, it probably would first appear in jurisdictions
which adopted the strict tort liability approach of Santor and
thereby placed the initial liability on the manufacturer, thus
forcing him to protect himself by contract in conscionable agreements with the intermediaries of the marketing chain. At present,
barefaced disclaimers of consequential damages are much more
common than mere limitations of liability.
Moreover, both arguments fail to give sufficient weight to the
helpless position in which the consumer finds himself when faced
with the manufacturer's overwhelming power. At the same time,
risk spreading is as practical and equitable in the area of economic
loss as it is in the area of personal injury. The implementation
of this risk spreading can be accomplished most directly by
holding the manufacturer liable to the consumer for economic
loss. Once this liability is well established, the manufacturer
will be able to contract with the other members of the product
distribution system, the wholesalers and retailers, so that they
absorb some proportionate part of the risk of liability. Of course,
these contractual provisions will be subject to the UCC's requirement of conscionability which will, like the manufacturerconsumer relationship, be based to an important extent on the
relative bargaining strength of the manufacturer-wholesaler or
manufacturer-retailer relationships. The result will be a division
of the risk among all the elements of the production and distribution chain. Furthermore, the cost of this insurance against
consequential economic loss, so spread over the chain, will be
reflected in the price; the ultimate consumer will bear his proportionate share of the risk.
Although the rationale underlying such risk spreading is that
of using the manufacturer as a mere conduit through which the
economically injured consumer is compensated, the result is a
burden on the manufacturer which must be further justified. In
an ideal economic system, the manufacturer would be able to
adjust to this new liability merely by adding the cost of insurance
against economic loss to his price. His cost of goods would increase, but he would be able to maintain the identical profit
margin. The effect on the consumers of the product would
be a proportionate increase in price. However, in the imperfect
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economic system of the business world, the manufacturer cannot
afford to add insurance costs while refusing to change his margin
of profit. If he did, he would place himself in danger of pricing
his product out of the competitive market. Therefore, the result
of holding the manufacturer liable to consumers would be to
force him to reduce his profit margin since it will bear in part
the cost of this new insurance. In such a situation, the manufacturer who produces the most defect-free product will have
the greatest profit margin. The cumulative effect on the community of holding manufacturers liable to consumers can only
be to promote defect-free products.
Hence, the capacity of the manufacturer to spread the risk
is not the sole factor upon which liability is based. Whether
the harm is great or small, the manufacturer is responsible for the
initial act of creating the defect which causes the harm. This
is the so-called "conditional fault,"80 the primary basis of liability,
which justifies reducing the manufacturer's profit margin.
The fault basis of liability is emphasized by the need to
prove that a defect existed while the product was in the control
of the manufacturer. Although not identical to the concept of
due care, the fault involved in the production of defective merchandise is within the manufacturer's control. The manufacturer
is not held to a standard of perfection; all that is required is
commercially reasonable merchantability-a standard which can be
met by the scientific application of quality controls. s '

Conclu'ion
The chief virtue of the Santor holding is that it is candidly
unrestricted by statute and traditional tort or contract concepts,
while it does not radically depart from precedent. It shifted the
risk of economic loss from the consumer to the producer in
conformity with the ancient practice of tort law of making those
who cause loss to others compensate them for the damage done.
The stability provided by statute is not lost, for the statute is
not totally rejected; but its substance is adapted to conform to
modem marketing conditions.
Yet, flexibility permitting the
continued development of tort law is maintained.
Those who charge judicial usurpation of the legislative
function or judicial disregard of the legislative mandate may be
answered by
the fact that all judicial law-making is also legislative. The very
conception of the decision as a precedent makes it legislative in nature,
80 See generally Keeton, Conditioital Fault It The Law Of Torts, 72
HARv. L. REv. 401 (1959).
81 Cowan, Sone Policy Bases Of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REv.
1077, 1090-92 (1965).
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. [SJince the courts have made up

almost the whole body of tort law without benefit of legislative aid,
it is quite anomalous to charge them %ith legislative usurpation when
they refashion their own creation.82
Strict liability in tort was developed solely for the protection of
consumers. Although originally used only where personal injuries
resulted from defective products, there is no reason why it must
be so limited. Similar results may be achieved under the UCC,
with perhaps a lesser degree of flexibility, if the courts refuse to
enforce disclaimers of liability for consequential economic loss on
grounds of unconscionability.
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